| MINNEAPOLIS PERSONAL INJURY ATTORNEY |
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In re Petition for Disciplinary Action against Michael F. Swenson: ETHICS - correction in disciplinary decision fact statements1STATE OF MINNESOTA IN SUPREME COURT A07-1131 In re Petition for Disciplinary Action against Michael F. Swensen, a Minnesota Attorney, Registration No. 216847 O R D E R Based upon the files, records, and proceedings herein, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the petition of the Director of the Office of Lawyers Professional Responsibility for rehearing be, and the same is, granted for the limited purpose of correcting a factual misstatement in the slip opinion filed November 15, 2007. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the paragraph that begins on page 4 and ends on page 5 of the slip opinion filed November 15, 2007, is hereby modified to read as follows: The second mortgagee foreclosed on the Minneapolis property in October 2002. When L.J. contacted Ryerson upon receipt of the foreclosure pleadings, Ryerson told L.J. that she and respondent had obtained refinancing and that there was no reason for concern. Respondent later informed L.J. that a buyer had been found and that her investment would be repaid out of the sale proceeds. On January 16, 2003, respondent directed L.J. to sign a quit claim deed transferring her interest in the property to Ryerson. On the same day, respondent and Ryerson conveyed the Minneapolis property by warranty deed to respondent’s father, using the mortgage loan obtained with the September 2001 contract for deed to fund 2 the purchase.2 At closing, Ryerson received more than 5,000 as the “payoff” on the contract for deed to respondent’s father. It has been deemed admitted that “the contract for deed was a sham transaction” used, together with the quit claim deeds, “to divest [L.J.] of her interest in the property.” Ryerson was issued checks totaling 2,388.07 in payment for her purported interest in the September 2001 contract for deed. Although L.J. had invested more than 7,000 in the property, respondent and Ryerson paid her none of the closing proceeds but instead converted the proceeds to their own use. Ryerson subsequently directed respondent’s father to sign a blank quit claim deed of the Minneapolis property, which Ryerson completed to transfer ownership of the property to Mark O’Brien, the same third party who had purchased the Mound property. Said paragraph previously read as follows: The second mortgagee foreclosed on the Minneapolis property in October 2002. When L.J. contacted Ryerson upon receipt of the foreclosure pleadings, Ryerson told L.J. that she and respondent had obtained refinancing and that there was no reason for concern. Respondent later informed L.J. that a buyer had been found and that her investment would be repaid out of the sale proceeds. On January 16, 2003, respondent directed L.J. to sign a quit claim deed transferring her interest in the property to Ryerson. On the same day, respondent and Ryerson conveyed the Minneapolis property by warranty deed to respondent’s father, using the mortgage loan obtained with the September 2001 contract for deed to fund the purchase.2 At closing, Ryerson received more than 5,000 as the “payoff” on the contract for deed to respondent’s father. It has been deemed admitted that “the contract for deed was a sham transaction” used, together with the quit claim deeds, “to divest [L.J.] of her interest in the property.” Although L.J. had invested more than 7,000 in the property, respondent and Ryerson paid her only 2,388.07 for her “interest” in the September 2001 contract for deed. Ryerson subsequently directed respondent’s father to sign a blank quit claim deed of the Minneapolis property, which Ryerson completed to transfer ownership of the property to 2 The petition filed by the Director suggests, but does not specifically state, that the mortgage loan used to fund the purchase was the loan obtained with the contract for deed. 2 The petition filed by the Director suggests, but does not specifically state, that the mortgage loan used to fund the purchase was the loan obtained with the contract for deed. 3 Mark O’Brien, the same third party who had purchased the Mound property. Dated: January 1, 2008 BY THE COURT: /s/ G. Barry Anderson Associate Justice |
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Michael E. Douglas, Attorney at Law, Saint Paul MN. All Rights
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