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UNPUBLISHED CIVIL OPINIONS FROM THE MINNESOTA COURT OF APPEALSA07-1558County of Dakota, Respondent, Christine Marie Hromadko, n/k/a Christine Marie Ackerman, Respondent, vs. Scott Andrew Kohser, Appellant. KALITOWSKI, Judge Pro se appellant father, Scott Andrew Kohser, challenges several orders issued by the district court. Appellant argues that the district court abused its discretion when it (1) denied his motion to forgive past child support arrears without making adequate findings; (2) failed to make adequate findings to support its parenting-time rulings; (3) denied his request for additional discovery from respondent, and his request for discovery costs and sanctions against respondent and her attorney; and (4) denied his motion to amend the district court's findings. We affirm. = = = = A07-1824 A07-2130 Friends of the Riverfront, Relator, vs. Metropolitan Council, Respondent, Minneapolis Park & Recreation Board, Respondent. LARKIN, Judge Respondent Metropolitan Council (Met Council) delegated to its chairperson authority to approve a park land exchange proposed by Respondent Minneapolis Parks & Recreation Board (Park Board). Met Council later ratified its chairperson's approval of the exchange at a meeting. Relator Friends of the Riverfront challenges Met Council's decisions by writ of certiorari. Because Met Council's proceedings were quasi-legislative and therefore not reviewable by this court on a writ of certiorari, we discharge the writ of certiorari and deny relator's pending motion to amend the record. = = = = A07-1963 In re the Marriage of: Lyndon Layne Bartell, petitioner, Respondent, vs. Lorelee Ruth Bartell, Appellant. LARKIN, Judge In this marital dissolution matter, appellant challenges the district court's marital property division as inequitable and challenges the denial of need-based attorney fees. At oral argument on appeal, appellant challenged for the first time the district court's finding that neither party has the current ability to finance appellant's desired educational program. We affirm the district court's marital property division. But we reverse and remand the district court's order that each party shall pay his or her own attorney fees. We will not consider appellant's challenge to the district court's finding regarding financing of the educational program. = = = = A07-2058 Pamela N'soroma James, Relator, vs. Masterson Personnel, Inc., Respondent, Department of Employment and Economic Development, Respondent. JOHNSON, Judge An unemployment law judge (ULJ) found that Pamela N'soroma James quit her job at Masterson Personnel, Inc., after expressing dissatisfaction with her hourly wage. The ULJ concluded that James quit without a good reason caused by the employer. The ULJ came to this conclusion based only on evidence received from Masterson because James did not participate in the telephonic evidentiary hearing. After James sought an additional evidentiary hearing, the ULJ concluded that James had failed to show good cause for failing to participate in the hearing. We affirm. = = = = A07-2127 Roderick Kottom, Respondent, vs. Minnesota Department of Natural Resources, Appellant. MINGE, Judge Appellant asserts that forfeited animal pelts were improperly returned to respondent. Because respondent violated Minnesota law by possessing these animal pelts without proper labeling, we reverse. = = = = A07-2181 In re the Marriage of: Nicola Alexander-Knight, petitioner, Respondent, vs. Peter St. John Knight, Appellant. LARKIN, Judge The parties' marital dissolution decree awarded appellant title to the marital homestead, subject to a lien in respondent's favor. The decree required appellant to satisfy the lien within a specified period of time or place the homestead on the market for sale. After the period ended without satisfaction of the lien or sale, the district court found appellant in contempt of court and transferred title to the homestead from appellant to respondent for the purpose of sale. Appellant argues that the district court (1) lacked personal jurisdiction over him because he was not properly served with the contempt motion papers, (2) denied appellant due process of law by denying him a bifurcated hearing and the opportunity to call witnesses, (3) abused its discretion by failing to make findings as mandated by Hopp v. Hopp, 279 Minn. 170, 174-75, 156 N.W.2d 212, 216-17 (1968), and (4) abused its discretion by effectively altering the dissolution decree's property allocution when the district court transferred title of the marital homestead to respondent. We conclude that appellant waived his challenge to the alleged jurisdictional defect and was afforded due process of law. But we reverse and remand because the district court abused its discretion by finding appellant in contempt without making sufficient findings and by altering the property division determined in the judgment and decree. = = = = A07-2324 In the Matter of: Aster M. Habtesilassie, petitioner, Respondent, vs. Barnabas Araya Yohannes, Appellant. HALBROOKS, Judge In this pro se appeal, appellant challenges the district court's order dismissing his motion to vacate the order for protection (OFP) and for a new trial and imposing a 0 sanction against appellant. Because we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in extending the OFP or by denying appellant's motion to reopen the default judgment, we affirm in part. But because we conclude that the district court abused its discretion by imposing the sanction without first ordering appellant to show cause, we also reverse in part. = = = = A07-2336 David Maroney, et al., petitioners, Appellants, vs. State of Minnesota by its Commissioner of Transportation, Carol Molnau, Respondent. SCHELLHAS, Judge In this inverse-condemnation action, appellants challenge the district court's grant of summary judgment to respondent, arguing that the action should proceed because (1) respondent has gone beyond mere planning of the closure of the subject property's access point to Highway 52, and (2) whether the replacement highway access will be reasonably suitable and convenient is a fact question not properly decided on summary judgment. We agree with the district court that respondent has not gone beyond mere planning of the closure of the existing highway access, and for that reason, we conclude that appellant's action is premature; therefore, the district court erred in adjudicating the action on the merits by granting summary judgment. Because we also conclude that whether the replacement highway access will be reasonably suitable and convenient is a fact question and not appropriately decided on summary judgment, we reverse and remand for dismissal without prejudice. = = = = A07-2338 Vernon Gardinier, Appellant, vs. Maryland Avenue Auto Sales, Inc., defendant and third party plaintiff, Respondent, vs. Phillip Murray Gardinier, Third Party Defendant. COLLINS, Judge Appealing from the district court's dismissal of his claims for possession of a motorcycle that was repossessed by respondent, appellant argues that the district court erred by finding that (1) respondent reasonably relied on a certificate of title in appellant's brother's name when respondent made a loan to appellant's brother and (2) appellant failed to prove that he was a good-faith owner of the motorcycle when the loan was made and the lien was attached to the motorcycle. Because respondent reasonably relied on appellant's brother's certificate of title when the loan was made and appellant failed to establish that he was the good-faith owner of the motorcycle at the time, we affirm. = = = = A07-2344 Rinzin Rinzin, Relator, vs. Olmsted County Housing and Redevelopment Authority, Respondent. MINGE, Judge Relator seeks review of the decision of a hearing officer that he was ineligible to participate in the Section 8 rental-assistance program, arguing that the decision was unsupported by substantial evidence. Because we find that the hearing officer's decision was unsupported by substantial evidence, we reverse. = = = = A07-2378 In re the Marriage of: Samuel Joseph Danna, petitioner, Appellant, vs. Jori Lynn Danna, Respondent. BJORKMAN, Judge This is an appeal from a judgment and decree ordering appellant to pay permanent spousal maintenance to respondent in the amount of ,335 per month. Because the district court abused its discretion in awarding respondent permanent spousal maintenance, and because the district court's findings regarding appellant's income are clearly erroneous, we reverse and remand to the district for the requisite findings on these issues. = = = = A08-0024 Healing Spirit Clinic, PLC, Relator, vs. Arlo M. Christianson, Respondent, Department of Employment and Economic Development, Respondent. CONNOLLY, Judge Relator asserts that respondent Arlo M. Christianson was discharged for employment misconduct and is therefore disqualified from receiving unemployment benefits. Because Christianson's actions did not rise to the level of employment misconduct, we affirm. = = = = A08-0222 Karyn Larson Smith, Appellant, vs. Argosy Education Group, Inc., et al., Respondents, Family Networks, Inc., Respondent. KLAPHAKE, Judge Appellant Karyn Larson Smith challenges the district court's order granting judgment on the pleadings in favor of respondents Argosy Education Group, Inc., and Family Networks, Inc., on appellant's breach of contract and whistleblower claims. Appellant also argues that the district court abused its discretion by denying her request to amend her complaint. Because appellant's complaint failed to set forth a legally sufficient claim for relief, and because appellant's proffered amendments did not cure this problem, the district court did not err by dismissing the complaint and denying the amendment. We therefore affirm. = = = = A08-0308 Nathan Daniel Clark, Appellant, vs. Joan Fabian, et al., Respondents. HUSPENI, Judge On appeal from the dismissal of his action against respondents, appellant Nathan Daniel Clark argues that the district court erred in ruling that all claims were time-barred. Because it clearly and unequivocally appears from the face of the complaint that all statutes of limitations had run on appellant's claims, and because the complaint contains no pleaded facts tolling the running of the statutes of limitations, we affirm. |
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Michael E. Douglas, Attorney at Law, Saint Paul MN. All Rights
Reserved. Minnesota Law Firm representing Personal Injury, Car / Auto Accident, Workers Compensation, Medical Malpractice, Social Security Disability claims. Dedicated to Injured Workers, Victims of Negligence, Car Accidents, Victims of Fraud, and those in need of legal assistance. |
